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CRIMINOLOGY AND THE LAW OF GUILT*
JOHN S. STRAHORN, JR.i
RECIDIVISM AND MENS REA

The third type of theory of the ethics of punishment is the one called
herein recidivism. Under such heading the concern is neither with the
achieved criminal result nor with the type of conduct which the offender has
committed. Rather it is with the personality of the offender, particularly with
reference to the prospects of future criminality from him. The legal requirement of criminal intent is correlated to this theory. It furnishes a device by
which it is provided that one shall not be punished, even if he has actually
caused a stated criminal result, unless further he has thereby manifested
48
sufficient anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism.
Herein the law has not been particularly concerned with the penological
question of the internal nature of societal treatment, i. e., whether it should
49
seek to frighten, reform, educate, segregate, or despatch the offender.
Rather, in the present recidivistic vein, the law of guilt has assumed the
object to be a constant and has dealt more closely with the matter of the
necessity and quantity of such treatment. Thus the problem has been to
determine whether the instant offender needs to be frightened, reformed,
educated, segregated, or despatched, i. e., whether he manifests a likelihood
of future criminality. If so, he must be punished. If not, he may go free.
* The first installment of this article, containing footnotes '-47, appeared in the February
issue of the RLViEw. (936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 491.
t A. B., 1922, St. John's College; LL. B., 1925, Washington and Lee University; S. J. D.,
1926, Harvard University; J.S. D., i93i, Yale University; Professor of Law, University of
Maryland School of Law; author of The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attentpts
(930) 78 U. OF PA. L. Rnv. 962; Extra-Legal Materials and the Law of Eidence (1934)
-9 ILL. L. REv. 3o, and other articles in legal periodicals.
48. To the effect that the legal requirement of mens rea is a device for the ascertainment
of the personal dangerousness of the offender, see Levitt, Extent and Function of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (923) 17 111- L. REV. 578, 589: "When the offender does that which is
forbidden he indicates that he may be, or might become, a menace to the security of that
social organization. . . . Yet, the intent may be an index to the character of the offender.
It may show whether the offender will be a continuing menace to society or whether the act
was unique and would not be likely to occur again. The treatment given the offender should
depend, inter alia, upon this likelihood." Id. at 594: "The mental state indicates the dangerousness of the offender, or the absence of such dangerousness. The intention to perform
the act may mean that the offender may intend to perform such acts again. This intent is an
index to future action. Such action the criminal law wishes to prevent. The intent is therefore an index as to what kind of treatment is to be given to the offender. It is an index, but
not a final determinant. . . . The intent is an index to the treatment the offender is to receive because it is a possible index to other mental states the existence of which go to make
the offender dangerous to society."
49. See MICHAEL, AND ADLER, Ca&E, LAw, AND SocIAL SCIENcE (1933) 361: "The
question of what behavior should be made criminal is thus answerable without reference to
the question how should offenders be treated. The most important consequence of the independence of these two problems is the elimination from the behavior content of the criminal
law of the penal gradation of offenses and the concept of responsibility."
(600)
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An exclusive application of the recidivism theory of criminology to
criminal law and procedure would result in an investigation into the instant
defendant's potentialities for future social damage and in no further inquiry.
Thus penal treatment would be administered only to those whose personal
anti-social tendency was sufficiently dangerous to merit the law's attention.
The length and type of this treatment would vary according to the degree of
this anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism. Each case would then
require a very careful and very personal investigation.
But the legal principles of guilt finding do not concern themselves alone
with personal dangerousness or anti-social tendency. Consideration of this
is but one of the three problems of the legal elements of guilt. Juries do not
have the time for such a very careful personal inquiry. To the extent to
which it is both possible and desirable to investigate the defendant's likelihood
of recidivism in the trial before the jury the law provides a device therefor
in the form of the third of the elements, the requirement of criminal intent
or mens rea. This element is variable between different crimes both in the
statement of nominal operative facts and in the degree or sort of anti-social
tendency demanded to be proven by these different facts. The former variation is due to differences in the type of conduct in question, which call for
varying word-devices, and the latter is due to varying considerations of
corpus delicti-vengeance and causation-deterrence which call for a varying
degree and sort of anti-social tendency as an element of guilt.
The function of the device of mens rea is to give effect, as far as may
be possible in a jury trial, other demands being considered, to the desire to
incarcerate only those who possess a personal anti-social tendency calling for
some treatment, and to free those who do not possess a sufficiently serious
one.
Other agencies of criminal procedure and other legal principles than
those of narrow guilt-finding also purport to function on a basis of the personal anti-social tendency of the defendant. Thus suspended sentence, probation, parole, pardon, indeterminate sentence, judicial discretion as to length
of sentence, the Baumes laws, 50 the juvenile court system, the classification
and separate treatment of separate types of convicts all present to us devices
which while not concerned solely with guilt or innocence likewise function on
the basis of likelihood of recidivism. 5 '
50. I. e., the laws providing for more severe penalties /for recidivists than for first
offenders.
51. The now historical device of benefit of clergy must be considered as another principle functioning in terms of the anti-social tendency of the offender. As this device developed, and before its eventual abolition, it provided to apply as a means for waking the punishment less severe for first offenders. The branding on the thumb of those who were
granted clergy made it impossible for recidivists to escape the capital punishment for their
later felonies. The term "malice aforethought" in murder came into our law by virtue of
the test set up in the time of Henry VIII for removing such murders from benefit of clergy.
Many other felonies were similarly removed from benefit of clergy. On the topic see KENNY,
OuTLINES or CRrINAL LAW (ioth ed. I920) 124, 48 -I.
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The obvious awkwardness of the separate handling of the single problem
of recidivism would seem to suggest that the whole problem of anti-social
tendency should largely be merged into one and that handled otherwise than
by the jury, leaving to them only the function of finding the social damage
and the defendant's causation thereof.5 2 The writer does not plan to go
further into this than to say that he approves it on theory. As he is dubious
of any early adoption of it, he plans to concern himself immediately with an
attempt at understanding what the law is actually trying to do by its present
requirement of mens rea as one of the jury-trial elements of guilt-finding.
The legal requirement of criminal intent or mens rea is a matter of the
jury's handling a certain portion of the problem of the personal dangerousness of the defendant, viz., those aspects of recidivism as can be discerned
from the manner of committing the crime and can be measured by jury-trial
rules of guilt. The instant question is how well the various nominal operative facts have performed their function of making likelihood of recidivism
an element of legal guilt.
The problem of recidivism in the law of guilt has not only the question
of the general considerations involving it, but two specific aspects which must
be differentiated. First is that of the extent to which the prosecution must
prove operative facts tending to show that the defendant does possess such
an anti-social tendency as to justify punishment. Is it sufficient for the
prosecution merely to show the causation of the social damage, on the theory
that the anti-social tendency is implicit therein, or must it go further and
demonstrate the likelihood of recidivism by additional subjective facts?
Second, to what extent may the defendant secure acquittal by proving certain
criminal defenses the nub of which is to show that actually he does not possess the anti-social tendency apparently proven by the case against him? The
.respective headings will be general principles, the requirement of mens rea,
and the mens rea defenses.
GeneralPrinciples
A fundamental proposition which cannot be emphasized too much is
that there is not necessarily involved in any or all of the nominal operative
facts in crimes which serve this requirement any actual state of mind or
guilty intent on the part of the offender. Fundamentally mens rea or crim52. Hints of such proposals are to be found in the writings of Professors Levitt and
Glueck. See generally, Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1922) I7 ILL. L.
REv. 117; and Levitt, Extent and Functioi of the Doctrine of Mens Rea (1923) 17 I. L.
REV. 578. See also Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv.

453, 475, calling for a separation of the guilt-finding and treatment (sentence imposing)
features of criminal procedure, and an expert handling of the latter problem. Id. at 476,
note 3o, refers to the proposal of Governor Smith of, New York to the same end in 1927.
Apparently Professor Glueck would, however, preserve mens rea as an element of guilt
finding to be determined by the jury. GLUEcK, MENTAL DISORDER. AND THE CRImIN-TAL LAW
(1925) 486.
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inal intent is an abstract quality of the offender's personality as shown by the
totality of his conduct. His actual state of mind may for certain crimes or on
certain occasions, serve as an evidential fact of the separate (if conceptual)
fact of mens rea. Thus the legal propositions mingle mentalist and behaviorist concepts. This accords with the dictionary definition of intent which is
in the alternative (i) a turning of the mind, design or purpose, and, (2)
meaning or import. Some operative facts of mens rea are nominally states
of mind, to be proven by conduct, while others, nominally in terms of conduct, can be proven by conduct appearing through a state of mind or on its
own behalf.
The term mens rea as used herein has several synonyms which will be
used interchangeably. All of them serve to express the abstract quality of
the offender's conduct which reflects his personality and potentialities. This
quality is required as an element of guilt in pursuance of the recidivism
theory. It is sought after by the particular operative facts in the definitions
of specific crimes which in general form the subject of this immediate treatment. These synonyms are anti-social tendency, personal dangerousness,
likelihood of recidivism, criminal intent, and manifestation of non-deterrability.
The last of these synonyms- manifestation of non-deterrability--calls
for some extended discussion which will serve to show the relation between
the causation-deterrence and intent-recidivism problems, and at the same time
serve to justify the recidivism approach and the requirement of mens rea in
criminal law. The object of deterrent punishment is to lessen the number
of future crimes by using the spectacle of present punishment to frighten
potential offenders. A further assumption is that some few members of the
human race are not thus frightened. These persons, who are not deterred,
are themselves potential offenders. The state of not being deterred by the
punishment of others is, ipso facto, the state of having the personal antisocial tendency concerned in the recidivism theory. But society must have
some objective way of ascertaining who is in this class. It must wait till the
members thereof tangibly manifest their non-deterrability and correlative
anti-social tendency by the causation of social damage. When this happens,
punishment follows, both to frighten other possible offenders and to handle
the potential danger from the very individual. The mens rea requirement is
a device for ascertaining what persons are not deterrable and hence are too
dangerous to be at large.
Before analyzing any of the individual problems of the extent to which
the prosecution must make proof of the accused's anti-social tendency, or
how far he may be allowed to disprove it, it is proposed to make a cursory
and comparative statement of certain general assumptions about human conduct which seem to be implicit in various of the specific legal rules.
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The most fundamental assumption made by the rules of criminal intent
is that one possesses a tendency to do whatever one has already done ("repetition of conduct"). 53 Further it is assumed that one possesses a greater
tendency to do those things which human beings frequently engage in than
to do those things which are usually but sporadic ("normality of conduct").54
This also involves the assumption that there is a greater human tendency to
do that which is forbidden by the law alone than that which is also forbidden
by religion, public opinion, and the other agencies of social control.
An important assumption is that if human conduct is a reaction to a
definite stimulating factor, the likelihood of recurrence of the conduct
depends on the likelihood of recurrence of the factor ("stimulating factor") .55 Two other assumptions are dependent each on the other. One is
that the likelihood of future performance of conduct, however manifested,
indicates a greater or lesser anti-social tendency to the extent to which the
happening of such conduct entails the probability of resultant social damage
("intrinsic dangerousness"). 56 The other is that a likelihood of future
conduct, however manifested, indicates a tendency to cause whatever social
damage is naturally and probably consequent to such conduct ("natural and
probable consequences")

.57

An important assumption which is implicit in many of the crimes calling
for specific intent is that the existence of a desire, plan, or expectation on the
part of a human being for a definite result shows that he possesses more of a
tendency to commit the conduct thus desired, planned, or expected, than if
53. The statements in parentheses are meant to be brief, descriptive titles concerning the
subject matter of the particular assumption made by the rules of criminal intent about human
conduct. For the following ones it is planned to give footnote examples of specific rules of
criminal intent which seem to be based on the respective principles of conduct. The present
one--"repetition of conduct"-seems to be so fundamental to the whole field of criminal intent that no particular example is necessary. In such crimes as rape and sodomy, for instance,
the law implies from the bare doing of such acts a tendency to repeat them.
54. Thus the intent will the sooner be held implicit in the causative conduct for a violation of the pure food laws than for bigamy. This is because the'causative conduct of selling
food in the former case is itself so much more likely of being repeated, due to its normality,
than is the causative conduct of getting married.
55. Thus one who kills in reaction to the stimulating factor of personal hatred, a frequent stimulus, is deemed to have a greater anti-social tendency-that of a murderer-than
is one who reacts similarly to the relatively less frequent stimulus of sight of wife's adultery,
which indicates less anti-social tendency-that for manslaughter. Further, one who reacts
to the very infrequent stimulus of mistaken belief in necessity for self-defense, which negatives any anti-social tendency of a degree sufficient for societal treatment goes totally free.
56. Thus he who while engaged in an act dangerous to life accidentally kills is thought
to have more of an anti-social tendency-that of a murderer-than is the one who accidentally
kills while engaged in the negligent operation of an automobile and who is thought to have
but the lesser tendency requisite for manslaughter. The relative intrinsic dangerousness of
the other conduct which furnishes the intent element in murder and manslaughter, respectively, provides the difference between these two crimes in terms of anti-social tendency.
57. The rule is frequently stated, in rationalizing cases involving the intent element in
homicide, that "one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his conduct." This merely means that the doing of an act which naturally and probably tends to a
given anti-social result sufficiently shows, by virtue of the tendency to repeat the original
conduct, a tendency to create the probable and consequential result so as to call for whatever
punishment is assessed against those who do have such latter tendencies.
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he did not have the desire, plan, or expectation ("desire, plan, or expectation") .58

The remaining three assumptions are related. One is that an actor who
is aware of his immediate conduct shows more of a tendency to repeat the
conduct than if he is not aware ("awareness of conduct"). 59 Likewise, one
who is aware of the probability of certain physical consequences from his conduct shows by the doing of the conduct more of a tendency to create the consequences than if he is not aware of the probability ("awareness of physical
consequences"). 0 Finally there is the matter of "awareness of societal consequences." 61 One who has not yet engaged in criminal conduct is assumed
to have less of an anti-social tendency to the extent to which he has refrained
because of his awareness (and fear) that punishment might follow. On the
other hand, one who has actually engaged in anti-social conduct is assumed to
show more of an anti-social tendency to the extent to which he was then aware
that such consequences might follow. He has not been deterred by the spectacle of the punishment of others.
These principles are not here asserted necessarily to have any psychological validity. They are here collected merely to make a comparative statement
of the divers assumptions which the law-makers seem to have made in working out the specific rules of mens rea. They are human assumptions about the
significance of human conduct as indicative of human anti-social tendencies.
The Requirement of Mens Rea
The first principal problem under this heading is whether for a given
crime the requisite anti-social tendency or mens rea is sufficiently indicated
by the bare fact of the defendant's causation of the social damage or must
be proven by the showing of additional subjective operative facts specifically
directed at the issue of likelihood of recidivism under the name of criminal
58. Thus a man who breaks and enters a house with the "intent to commit a felony
therein" is held to have sufficient anti-social tendency for the more serious crime of burglary,
whereas without that "intent!' he is, at most, but a trespasser. The existence of his "desire,
plan, or expectation" to commit a felony, when concurrent with his causing the stated criminal result of housebreaking, shows that his personality is of the more dangerous sort than
if he lacked such a mental state.
59. Thus it is understood that the sleepwalker who while unaware of what he is then
doing kills another person, must go free because his unawareness makes it less likely that
his external conduct indicates a settled tendency to do such things with sufficient frequency
to make him a dangerous offender. One branch of the insanity defense, perhaps with less
functional justification, acquits the one who from mental defect is unable to know the nature
and consequences of his act.
6o. Many criminal definitions involve the use of such words as "knowingly," "knowledge," etc. Thus one who receives the goods of another with knowledge that they are stolen
goods is thought thereby to show more of an anti-social tendency than if he receives them
without an awareness of the physical consequence of interfering with the possession of the
true owner.
6i. This concept underlies the problems of ignorance of law, infancy, and the insanity
defense. As we shall see, general unawareness of societal consequences is not defensive because, still, the offender is thought to show sufficient anti-social tendency for treatment. On
the other hand, the fact of unawareness of societal consequences is expressly made the test
for the functioning of the infancy and the insanity defenses.
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intent. For those crimes in the latter class the second problem thus becomes
that of the significance of those words and phrases which are inserted in
criminal definitions designedly to require extrinsic proof on the issue of the
offender's personal dangerousness. What type or degree of anti-social tendency or how much proof thereof is requisite, as the operative facts are
worded?
Intrinsic or minimum intent

This first problem of whether the requisite criminal intent is intrinsic
to the bare causative conduct could be stated and treated in three different
ways. One would be the way in which it will be presently handled, as a
matter of the extent to which extrinsic facts must be shown to establish the
anti-social tendency requisite for conviction. It is also a matter of the extent
to which mistake of fact is permitted as a defense. For in those crimes in
which mistake is not allowed the rule is, in effect, that the criminal intent is
manifested by the doing of the causative conduct alone. For most crimes,
particularly those where the intent must be shown extrinsically, a reasonable
mistaken belief as to the existence of a justifying fact is itself defensive.
Finally one could treat the problem as one of the crimes of omission. In
those crimes where one "acts at his peril" as to his creation of a socially
damaging result he has, in effect, omitted to ascertain the facts the ascertainment of which would have enabled him to avoid criminality. Thus he is
punished for his omission by being punished for the "morally" innocent
causation.
In certain types of crime the law works guilt without requiring any
further proof of criminal intent than is incidental to the doing of the bare
causative conduct. For the remainder of crimes the intent element must be
specifically demonstrated in the name of certain extrinsic facts which are
included in the criminal definition solely to establish the anti-social tendency.
In working out general principles applicable to this situation it is proposed
to use for examples typical cases of these separate crimes.
Thus it has been held that if a man has intercourse with a girl below
the age of consent he is guilty of carnal abuse even though he lacks aware62
ness of her nonage and reasonably believes her above the age.
Likewise it has been held that if one sells hard cider mistakenly believed
not to be fermented he is guilty of violating the liquor law. 63 On the other
62. Perhaps the leading case on this doctrine is Reg. v. Prince, 13 Cox. C. C. 138 (1875).
This was a case of taking an unmarried female under age out of the custody of her father.
The court held it not a valid defense that the defendant reasonably believed her to be above
age. While this was not a case of carnal abuse, yet the cases on carnal abuse are in accord
on this point in the analogous situation. The court intimated, however, that a mistake as to
the fact of the father's consent would have been a valid defense. This is a sound distinction
on a recidivistic basis. A mistaken belief as to the father's consent does show less tendency
to abduct females. A mistaken belief as to the girl's age does not show any lesser tendency
to abduct or carnally know girls.
63. People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333, 140 N. W. 648 (1913).
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hand the famous case of Regina v. Tolson 64 allowed the defendant, accused
of bigamy, to assert in defense her reasonable but mistaken belief that her
first husband was dead. What is there about carnal abuse and cider selling
that makes it appropriate that one act at his peril as to the creation of that
social damage which does not hold for the social damage of bigamy resulting
from marrying? The intent is held to be intrinsic to the conduct in the
former two cases but not in the latter.
The writer suggests that the determination of the question depends on
the following variables. First is the principle of "intrinsic dangerousness"
adverted to above. Second is the normality of the causative conduct. Third
is a separate question of the equivocality of the particular conduct.
Equivocality has reference to several features of a typical crime. To
the extent to which it is impossible to state verbal definitions of the causative
conduct which will cover only situations agreed to be socially damaging, the
conduct can be said to be equivocal: Hence it is necessary to add subjective
elements of criminal intent to avoid injustice in convicting. Then there may
be lack of human agreement that all cases of the same objective social damage
deserve the same or any punishment. This doubt, too, can be resolved by
further subjective operative facts. Finally there may be lack of human
agreement that social damage always follows from the initial conduct. This
doubt, too, is resolved by further subjective facts. Whenever there is equivocality of the conduct, it cannot be said that it alone demonstrates the requisite intent and the latter must be shown by further facts.
The rule of the Tolson case that the intent is not intrinsic to the conduct
alone, can be justified by such principles. The causative conduct-getting
married-is equivocal, i. e., it is conduct sufficiently desirous of being encouraged generally that it would be socially undesirable to have one act at his
peril in engaging in it. Then, even when done by the average person, it does
not intrinsically involve a high likelihood of social damage. Very few marriages are bigamous. Finally, it is conduct rarely repeated by the same individual. Under the "normality of conduct" principle there is less likelihood
of its being repeated than is more normal conduct.
On the other hand, in the carnal abuse case the conduct is not equivocal.
There is nothing desirable of being encouraged in extra-marital relations.
Then, too, there is more intrinsic dangerousness in the conduct itself. There
is more likelihood that extra-marital connection with a girl of the borderline
age will involve carnal abuse than there is that a marriage will be a bigamous
one. Finally, the average seducer repeats the act of extra-marital intercourse
far more frequently than does any bigamist repeat the marriage ceremony,
64. 23 Q. B. D. I68 (1889).

The writer is not unaware that the Tolson case is in the

numerical minority on the point and that probably, the majority of courts would reject the
defense of mistaken belief of the spouse's death. The writer feels, however, that the doctrine of the Tolsom; case represents the better view and for this reason, and because it
affords an excellent example of a case for applying the recidivism analysis, it is used herein.
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("normality of conduct"). On a relative basis one can differentiate between
the bigamy and carnal abuse situations. All in all, doing the bare causative
conduct of seducing a girl shows more likelihood of future carnal abuse of
too-young girls than does one marriage show a tendency to future bigamy.
Hence, by this rule the mens rea is not intrinsic in bigamy.
The cider case demands more analysis. Selling cider is an equivocal
occupation, desirable of being encouraged in some events. This alone would
seem to call for extrinsic proof of intent. But it is outweighed by considerations along the other two lines. Cider is very likely to get hard ("intrinsic dangerousness"). There is even more probability of cider being hard
cider than of extra-marital intercourse being with a too-young girl. And it
is conduct much more likely of being repeated by individuals generally ("normality of conduct"). These latter considerations serve to demonstrate that
there is implicit in the act of selling cider a high probability of future sales
of hard cider by this person.
Professor Sayre considers that the determining factors are to be found
in the severity of the penalty and whether the crime is a "public welfare
offense." 6' He considers that public welfare crimes, or police regulations,
entailing small penalties, are those wherein the intent is intrinsic whereas for
crimes which are morally wrong and have severe penalties, there can be no
punishment without a guilty mind.
The writer does not agree with this distinction, although the difference
may be only one of terminology. Rape and sodomy are hardly "public
welfare offenses" and the punishment is severe, yet they are crimes of
intrinsic intent. The severity of the penalty is but one of the items in the
broader issue of equivocality. The more severe the penalty, the less likely
it will be that all can agree that given conduct deserves punishment and the
more necessary it is to appease the squeamish ones by requiring additional
proof that the offender deserves punishment, i. e., further subjective proof
of criminal intent.
The ultimate test is whether the causative conduct in the given crime
itself shows such a high likelihood of repetition of such conduct as to indicate
that sufficient anti-social tendency is thereby demonstrated. This the writer
believes is to be found in terms of the equivocality of the conduct, its normality, and its potential dangerousness. Conduct which is less equivocal,
more normal and more dangerous is likely to be sufficient in and of itself,
while conduct more equivocal, less normal and less dangerous probably should
entail additional operative facts before the intent is held to be established.
The physical conduct of parking by a fire plug, human conduct considered, shows more likelihood of future traffic violations than does the physical
conduct of picking up a friend's watch show a future tendency to steal. The
65. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 55.
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concept of the former's being a public welfare offense, punished by the law
alone, while stealing is a moral offense or true crime, forbidden by law,
church, and public opinion, helps in deciding which conduct alone shows the
most dangerousness. But the writer feels that correct analysis of the situation should go deeper than a mere classification into true crimes and public
welfare offenses.
Extrinsically proven intent
We have seen that for some crimes, those of intrinsic intent, the requisite anti-social tendency is held to be indicated by the bare doing of the
causative conduct. Now we deal with those which are not in this class but
for which the likelihood of recidivism must be evidenced by proof of other
operative facts expressly added to criminal definitions in order to require
subjective proof of the mens rea issue. We have already dealt with the
reasons for requiring these additional operative facts. Our present problem
will be to analyze them as such. But we shall find that the same principles
which rationalize the law's separation of crimes into those of intrinsic and
extrinsic intent are also valuable in dividing the latter into groups according
to the extent of the requirement of extrinsically proven intent. For we shall
see that certain of these extrinsically required facts are really but nominal,
doing little more than to allow the defense of mistake of fact, if any. Others
do require definite extrinsic proof of the mens rea element, but vary in the
extent of the proof, the degree of anti-social tendency, or the sort of tendency.
In these crimes of extrinsic intent not only does the law apply the
recidivism theory by acquitting for lack of this extrinsically demanded proof,
even where there is causation of a corpus delicti, but frequently, for one and
the same causation and corpus delicti, the punishment is scaled according to
the extent of the mens rea. The classic example of this, which will be the
first topic, is the gradation of criminal homicide into degrees according to the
extent of the offender's likelihood of recidivism.
In homicide we see that constant causation and corpus delicti factors
may, according to the intent, run the whole gamut of criminality from complete acquittal to the extreme of capital punishment. 66 Homicide is never a
crime of intrinsic intent, although to be sure, one form of the lowest degreemanslaughter by the negligent omission of custodial or employment dutiesinvolves at most a nominal operative fact of extrinsic intent. But largely it
66. Professor Glueck describes the gradation of criminal homicide, along with the setting up of degrees of other crimes as crude individualizations of treatment. Glueck, Principles of a Rational Penal Code (1928) 41 HARv. L. 1EV. 453, 465. See also MICHAEL AND
ADLmE,
CRmIE, LAW, AND SoCIAL ScIEcE (1933) 358-9. The latter writers consider the
gradation of murder and larceny as matters of retribution. The present writer cannot agree
with this in the case of murder. The distinction between grand and petit larceny is, of
course, a matter of retribution or vengeance, as it involves a difference in the occurred criminal result. But the present writer feels that the gradation of criminal homicide involves a
constant criminal result with a constant demand for vengeance, with the difference taken in
terms of the anti-social tendency of the offender.
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is considered that the typical causative conduct for homicide does not by
itself and in all cases show sufficient anti-social tendency to justify punishment. And this is so despite the fact that the extreme social damage involved
in homicide allows for punishment on the slightest showing of anti-social
tendency-and that slighter than is allowed for most other crimes of extrinsic
intent. But still it must be demonstrated extrinsically. This is because the
typical causative conduct is equivocal, i. e., death may result from conduct
desirable of being encouraged on certain occasions-driving automobiles,
hunting, or target practice.
These considerations outweigh the fact that death frequently results
from such activity when engaged in by the average person. Then, the
extreme punishment given for some homicides further shows the equivocality and demands the firmest proof of mens rea before it be imposed.
Thus the extreme punishment for first degree murder is given only for
the highest manifestations of likelihood of recidivism. It is thought that
one who premeditates or kills accidentally in the course of the execution of
the most serious crimes shows this high anti-social tendency and a higher
one than he who merely kills intentionally on the spur of the moment or kills
accidentally while engaging in the middle group of other crimes. The latter
person is punished only for second degree murder. The person who kills
intentionally, but under the stimulus of a legally recognized provoking factor,
which occurs but infrequently, or the person who kills accidentally while
engaged in a very minor crime, or while negligent, or while omitting custodial or employment duties is thought to show but a minimum of anti-social
tendency. But this is sufficient in view of the great social damage he has
caused. He is punished for voluntary or involuntary manslaughter as the
case may be.
Thus the whole gradation of criminal homicide is seen to be in terms
of likelihood of recidivism or anti-social tendency. The purely accidental
killing is non-criminal. Intentional killings are divided according to the
mentalist concepts of premeditation, malice, and provocation. Non-intentional but criminal killings are graded according to the other conduct factors
present at the time of the actual causation. Engaging in the worst crimes
is thought to show the most about conduct, the middle class is felt to equal
malice without premeditation, and the minor class, along with negligence and
omission of duty is thought similar to desired killing on provocation. Some
of the nominal operative facts are mentalist in derivation, some frankly
behavioristic. All of them are merely ways of measuring the significance of
the offender's conduct with a view to ascertaining his personal tendencies and
of assessing societal treatment according to the degree of his likelihood of
causing future deaths. One cannot understand the words written into these
definitions without thinking of the reason for their being there. The writer
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submits that the reason for their existence and the rationale of their interpretation is a measurement of anti-social tendency.
When one turns to a general consideration of the crimes requiring
extrinsic proof of intent, one finds that the same words of criminal intent
or the same principles of recidivism are used in various crimes with different
meanings or emphasis. Thus the principle of constructive intent which
recognizes the proposition that one is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts, is followed for second degree murder
but not for certain other crimes where, as stated, the extrinsic operative
facts of intent are calculated to require proof of a very specific anti-social
tendency or a very high degree thereof. Normally the act of doing a
certain thing is thought to show a tendency to do that thing and likewise
to create whatever consequences normally follow from the doing of that
thing. But the degree of tendency to cause the latter consequences is one
of a limited extent only and wherever the policy is to require more tendency
or more proof thereof, or a tendency of a certain sort, the doctrine of constructive intent will not do.
Thus in Rex v. Williams 67 the act of cutting a woman dressed in
silk, for the purpose of wounding her body, was held not to show sufficient
"malice" to make the offender guilty of violating the statute against the
cutting of garments, even though the prisoner intended to cut through the
garments to the body. This decision can be rationalized in the light of
the purpose of the statute. It was passed to curb the practice of disgruntled
silk-weavers in slashing imported silk garments. Obviously it was intended
to punish only those who cut silk for the sake of cutting silk, i. e., those
who had the tendency to cut silk in the future. To be sure, one who shows
a tendency to stab women obviously shows some tendency to cut their garments. It, however, is not sufficient to prove the high degree of anti-social
tendency which the court felt was called for by the statute in the light of
the severe punishment, the equivocality of the conduct of cutting silk, and
the evil aimed at.
Likewise one who maliciously threw a stone at another, intending a
battery, but missed the victim and broke a window was held in Regina v.
Pembliton 1s not to have violated the malicious mischief statute even though
it provided to apply whether the malice should be against the owner of the
property or otherwise. The court here too interpreted the intent requirement as demanding proof of a tendency to break window panes as such,
which was not shown by an accidental breaking in the course of an act which
merely showed a tendency to battery. The degree of the proof of the
67. 2 Leach 597 (789).
68. 12 Cox C. C. 6o7 (1874).
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relevant tendency is higher in these cases than it is in second degree murder,
in view of the fact that the resultant social damage is not so serious.
Then, too, these early decisions which gave a trend to judicial interpretation of these various intent requirements are to be explained, as is much
of the detail of criminal law, as judicial reactions to extreme punishments
provided for minor offenses at the behest of powerful groups. But the
problem is still before us. Our war-time espionage laws, the "life for a
pint" and the "five and ten" laws present as sordid a chapter in penal law as
did the calendar of capital offenses under the first four Georges and the
latest William.
Then, for that matter, interpretation of the subjective intent elements
has not always been used as a way of contracting the application of criminal
prohibitions. The late Professor Tulin has pointed out 69 how some courts,
in states where there is no apt legislative penalty for the crime of reckless
driving of an automobile, have applied to reckless driving the penalty for
the aggravated assault with intent to kill in order to develop a sufficient punishment. They have ruled that the requisite "intent to kill or murder" can
be worked out constructively from the act of extreme recklessness in driving
a car. This does not seem a far development from working out criminality
as for a battery, but the majority view is otherwise and holds that the aggravated assault requires a specific actual intent to kill or murder. The majority of states, as a rule, do have a sufficient statutory penalty for reckless
driving in its own right and so there is no need for twisting the meaning of
specific intent. These courts refuse to apply-because they do not have
to-the doctrine of constructive intent to the aggravated assault.
The writer feels that it is equally justifiable for a court either to expand or contract the meaning of a word of extrinsic intent in order to meet
social needs. 70 He feels further that this is just what the courts have been
doing and that their actions are to be understood in terms of their demanding greater or lesser showings of the element of criminality concerned with
likelihood of recidivism. The existence of other penalties in the Williams
and Pembliton cases, viz., for battery and assault respectively, probably
motivated the courts in being strict as to the showing of the requisite intents
for the crimes actually proceeded under. In view of the fact that so many
of the intent words used by legislatures in defining crimes are mentalist in
nature, the courts are usually forced to work out their meaning. This, so
the writer believes, has been and should be done on a basis of determining
the degree, sort, and extent of proof of the anti-social tendency of the
offender to create the evil aimed at by the statute.
69. Tulin, The Role of Penaltiesin Criminal Law (1928)

37 YALE L. J. 1048.

70. See Sayre, Mens rea (1932) 45 Hagv. L. REv. 974, 989, 998, lOO3-4, ioi6, 1021, con-

cerning the extent to which the meaning of criminal intent has varied throughout the ages.
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This difference in the degree, sort, or proof of the likelihood of recidivism can be discerned by comparing certain related crimes. Thus for
forgery there is required only an "intent to defraud" while for uttering
there must be this plus a knowledge that the instrument is forged. The
mere act of writing another's name is not thought indicative of anti-social
tendency. But writing it under circumstances calculated to defraud shows
the almost nominal "intent to defraud." But to be guilty of circulating an
instrument forged by another one must realize that it is forged, i. e., have
an awareness of the physical consequences of his conduct. This is because
circulating instruments is very equivocal conduct which is normally desirable
of being encouraged. It is quite likely that very law-abiding persons will
accidentally circulate forged instruments, and so persons are not punished
unless they actually do something which does more certainly show the
requisite anti-social tendency.
So it is with larceny and receiving. Merely handling the property of
another does not show itself any anti-social tendency. But it is very easy
to prove the "animus furandi" which, when it accompanies the act of asportation, shows that the actor tends to be a thief. But non-criminal persons
may stumble into the handling of the stolen property of another, and so
a more specific element must be shown, i. e., knowledge that the goods are
stolen. Only this sufficiently shows a tendency to be a "fence" so as to
justify punishment for receiving stolen goods. The tendencies to pass
counterfeit money or to receive stolen goods are not so easily demonstrated
as the tendencies to forge and steal. The law recognizes this by its stricter
rules of extrinsic intent. These distinctions probably are on a basis of relative equivocality, i. e., one type of conduct the more clearly shows the
requisite tendency than the other.
Then, differences in the nominal and substantial requirements of intent
may be explained in terms of differences in the extent of the corpus delicti
or social damage involved in the instant crimes. There seems to be a definite
sliding scale in the criminal law. For extreme examples of social damage,
the law seems willing to convict on but a slight showing of likelihood of
recidivism, as witness manslaughter. On the other hand, where the occurred
social damage is but slight, and especially where the punishment is great in
proportion thereto, very high degrees or proof of anti-social tendencies are
required.
Thus one cannot be convicted for the slight social damage involved in
attempts save on a showing of a specific intent, i. e., desire, for the result
involved in the crime attempted. And where for the aggravated assaults
the punishment is made even greater than it was at common law for the
relative criminal attempt, the intent must even be more specific.
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Burglary is another example of a crime where, because of the slight
damage of the corpus delicti, the proof of intent must be of the highest
order. The objective result consists in being on the premises of another.
This alone is not enough but, if accompanied by the specific intent to commit
a felony thereon, it makes the burglar worthy of societal treatment. The
existence of the desire, plan, or expectation of the intended felony is thought
to show such a likelihood of recidivism as to justify incarceration despite
the creation of but a slight actual corpus delicti.
Criminal definitions are full of words calculated to require extrinsic
proof of the mens rea element. Such "mentalist" words and phrases as
malice, knowledge, intent, purpose, wilful, wanton, negligent, felonious, and
their derivatives are encountered frequently. Other types are words more
realistically descriptive of conduct or surrounding facts. But regardless
of the nature of these facts, the conclusion remains that in order to be
applied to the run of specific situations they have to be interpreted.
The writer submits that the significance of all these varying operative
facts of extrinsic intent is to enable the courts to apply punishment to those
who, having caused the requisite social damage, also manifest such an antisocial tendency as is contemplated by the instant prohibition. It is possible
to rationalize and understand the judicial rulings of the past on this basis
and, so the writer feels, the future application of the intent element of various
criminal prohibitions should be made on the same basis.
The Mens Rea Defenses
If the prosecution fails to prove beyond all reasonable doubt any one
of the three elements of guilt of any crime, viz., the corpus delicti, defendant's causation, and requisite mens rea, the defendant is entitled to be
acquitted. We have just been discussing the extent to which subjective
proof must be made of the third element. We have seen that for some
crimes the mens rea is sufficiently shown by the causative conduct and need
not further be demonstrated. For others, for reasons of policy, additional
and special proof directed at the intent element alone is required. Now we
deal with a group of criminal defenses which the defendant is allowed to
interpose in order to offer even more specific proof on the question of his
anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism. The purport of these is to
demonstrate that the defendant actually does not possess the anti-social
tendency apparently indicated by the required proof for the prosecution.
Where the jury is convinced of the existence of facts raising any one of
these relevant defenses the defendant is similarly entitled to an acquittal.
This is because it is believed that he does not possess the requisite and
anti-social tendency calling for societal treatment in his case. Just as the
absence of sufficient proof of the prosecution's case on the mens rea element
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calls for an acquittal, so does the proof of affirmative facts in defense which
reach the same end as the lack of the prosecution's case. Implicit in either
is the idea that societal treatment is administered to those who have caused
criminal results only when, further, it is indicated that the offender is
possessed of the requisite likelihood of recidivism. If this likelihood is
lacking, either because the state cannot show facts apparently indicating it,
or if so, because the defendant can offer more specific proof about it, there
is no need for frightening, reforming, segregating, or despatching the defendant and he may safely be trusted at large.
The various intent defenses will now be treated in two groups according to the principles of recidivism which seem to be involved in them. One
group is concerned with the principle of human conduct that the tendency
to create social damage varies according to the likelihood of the recurrence
of the stimulating factor which motivates the conduct of the instant individual. The other group is concerned with certain defenses which revolve
around the significance of one's awareness of one's conduct, its physical and
its societal consequences.
Reaction to a stimulating factor
It was suggested above that one of the general principles of recidivism
found occasionally reflected in the mens rea requirement or its defenses was
that of "stimulating factor." This is stated to the effect that if it can be
discerned that defendant's instant creation of social damage is a definite
reaction to a specific stimulating factor, then it can be said that his tendency
to repeat the causation of such social damage varies according to the likelihood of the recurrence of the factor. Thus if it be a frequent factor, he
possesses a high tendency but if it be a very sporadic one, his likelihood of
recidivism is small. Certain of the intent defenses function on this basis
and recognize the existence of certain factors and their infrequent recurrence and call for the acquittal of those whose conduct is definitely a reaction
to them and nothing more. The theory is that the presence of these very
subjective factors outweighs the significance of the proof by the prosecution
of the intent requirement to the end that the instant defendant does not
possess the requisite anti-social tendency even though the state has proven
those facts, which in the case of the average man, do indicate that. The
intent defenses which function on this basis are: entrapment, coercion,
compulsion, necessity, self-defense, defense of another, defense of property, prevention of crime, prevention of escape, lawful arrest, domestic and
public authority, provocation, and mistake of fact.
We have seen how the consent defense involves the negation of the
corpus delicti. Entrapment, on the other hand, is a matter of a criminal
defense demonstrating a subjective lack of anti-social tendency. It is an
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excellent example of a non-intent defense. For, as the legal rule is worded
when the operative facts for this narrowly interpreted defense are present,
it is clearly indicated that the entrapped person does not possess the antisocial tendency apparently indicated by the bare doing of the causative
conduct for the instant crime. To be defensive it must be shown that it
was very unlikely that the entrapped person would have violated the particular law but for the blandishments of the entrapping officer. These
blandishments provide the sporadic stimulating factor. Because of the
infrequency of their recurrence it can be postulated that defendant's conduct
will be of similar infrequent recurrence and hence he may safely be trusted
at large.
So it is with coercion and compulsion and, incidentally, necessity, which,
with varying emphasis, are allowed as defenses to non-capital crimes. If one
commits the crime only because of the duress, it is believed that he shows a
tendency to react only to the sporadic stimulating factor of the duress and so
does not show a sufficiently ingrained personal tendency to commit crime to
justify treatment by the recidivism theory.
Likewise does the stimulating factor principle justify the group of
criminal defenses which include defense of self, another, property, and the
exercise of public authority involved in prevention of crime, prevention of
escape, and lawful arrest. The specific limitations on the exercise of these
privileges also emphasize considerations of recidivism. He who uses only
necessary force in defending his person, for instance, does not show sufficient anti-social tendency to be dangerous, but he who uses unnecessary force
in such an event does show that tendency and so must be incarcerated. He
who creates the need for self-defense, i. e., the aggressor, does show a
tendency to kill, and so he is not permitted the defense.
The reduction of second degree murder to manslaughter upon proof of
adequate provocation has already been mentioned. To a certain extent it
involves a non-intent defense to second degree murder although the result
is not absolute acquittal but only conviction of a lesser crime. This proposition also involves the stimulating factor principle. It is believed that one
who kills only on the stimulus of provocation, including sight of wife's
adultery, sudden assault, unlawful arrest and mutual combat, shows only
a tendency to react to that type of factor which, while it recurs frequently
enough to indicate some tendency-especially in view of the extreme social
damage-yet does not do so frequently enough to make the crime murder.
Likewise the general defense of mistake of fact, already mentioned in
connection with intrinsic intent, is a manifestation of the stimulating factor
principle. A reasonable mistaken belief in the existence of a fact which,
if true, would be defensive, is itself defensive. It is believed that-in cases
of crimes where mistake is allowed, i. e., where the intent is not intrinsic
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-the mistake which motivates the action is of such infrequent recurrence
that it can safely be said that the defendant does not possess a general antisocial tendency but only a tendency to react to a sporadic stimulus. Hence
he is acquitted for lack of a sufficient anti-social tendency. If he reacts
to an unreasonable mistake, or to a mistaken belief in a non-justifying factor, he shows a tendency to react too often and so is sufficiently dangerous
for societal treatment.
Awareness of cdnduct and of its physical and societal consequences
Certain criminal defenses involve the matter of the extent to which
one's awareness of his immediate conduct, or of its physical or societal
consequences, indicates a greater or lesser anti-social tendency on his part.
The particular problems are intoxication, ignorance of law, infancy, and
insanity.
Intoxication actually indicates a lack of awareness of one's immediate
conduct. But in law it is never defensive save to crimes involving a specific
intent and then only if it actually prevents the existence of the requisite
specific intent. The writer submits that the rule and its exception are both
sound on a recidivistic basis. One who gets drunk and kills or rapes probably shows a tendency to get drunk and kill or rape again, and that sufficiently for the fairly low level of anti-social tendency involved in those
crimes. Where the level of intent required is but low, non-awareness of
conduct does not negative likelihood of recidivism. On the other hand,
where it is high, as for larceny and for attempt crimes, involving specific
intent, the fact of drunkenness probably does negative the very specific
tendency, or very aggravated tendency, or high degree of proof demanded
so that it is safe to acquit. The drunken person who takes a "no-parking"
sign, or who breaks in a window, or who goes too far in a "necking"
party, probably does not show the same specific tendency to steal, commit
burglary, or rape as would a sober man who did exactly the same physical
conduct. 7" Another example of non-awareness of immediate conduct is
the sleep-walker. It seems agreed that one is not guilty of a crime committed
while asleep. But this is different from the drunken person who murders
or rapes. Sleep-walkers have not been a social problem. The recurrence
71. Usually the crimes of specific intent require either a knowledge of some facts independent of the present conduct of the offender or a desire or plan to do something other than
that which he actually achieves. Thus the crime of receiving requires a knowledge of the
independent fact of the stolen quality of the goods. The crime of burglary requires, in addition to actual breaking of a house, a desire or plan for an independent felony within it. The
attempt crimes require, in addition to the presence of the corpus delicti of the attempt, a desire or plan for the separate corpus delicti of the major crime. Where the required intent is
but a factor of the very conduct which the offender is doing, the fact of drunkenness does not
negative sufficient tendency from that conduct. But where the required intent involves an
awareness of some fact extrinsic to the conduct, or a desire or plan for some other conduct
than that actually engaged in, the fact of drunkenness does negative both the tendency to do
those extrinsic things and the requisite mental state which is the nominal operative fact.
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of social damage from them has not been so evident as it has been from
drunken persons. Hence it is safe to assume a lack of anti-social tendency
for them, but not for the drunken person.
Ignorance of law, i. e., a non-awareness of societal consequences on the
part of a mentally normal adult, is not defensive, although, like intoxication,
mistaken application of law may negative a requisite specific intent. On
the other hand, we shall see that ignorance of law is the very test for the
ensuing defenses of infancy and insanity. We have already suggested that
when one does commit a crime, he shows a lesser anti-social tendency if he
be ignorant of the societal consequences therefor than if he be aware. But
the law postulates that even then he shows sufficient tendency to call for
treatment. Hence the rule that ignorance of the law generally is no defense.
The exception for specific intent is but analogous to the similar one for
intoxication. Where the proof of intent must be very high, then the relative
lesser tendency is relevant. The main rule itself is based on the idea that
one who has not been deterred by the punishment of others equally indicates
an anti-social tendency regardless of whether his not being deterred results
from his unawareness of the punishment of others or from his not being
influenced thereby when he is aware. In either event he is a dangerous individual to have at large. Whether it is because he was never "vaccinated"
by observing previous punishment or his actual "vaccination" did not
"take," he is a social problem. If his present anti-social conduct proves the
point, deterrence must then seek to work on him individually by bringing to
his attention more vividly-by punishing him--societal demands about conduct. The exception for specific intent is but another manifestation of the
"stimulating factor" principle. Reaction to a mistaken application of law
to fact is a reaction to a very sporadic stimulating factor which indicates a
very slight anti-social tendency. Reaction to a general ignorance of the
main prohibition itself is a reaction to a very frequent stimulus which indicates a high anti-social tendency.
In the infancy defense as it exists at common law 72 ignorance of law
is the very test for applying the defense and rightly so. For where for
the mentally normal adult ignorance of law shows an anti-social tendency,
i. e., lack of reaction to previous punishment of others, in the case of the
infant it merely shows that the infant has not yet learned societal
demands about conduct. But it is proper to suppose that he will
soon learn. Thus an infant under seven can never be convicted ol
crime. It is believed impossible that he has learned and yet believed probable that he will. Hence his conduct can never indicate anti-social tend72. The lack of treatment of the Juvenile Court is not meant to convey any impression
of the insignificance of that institution which does, of course, function on a basis of the
recidivism theory. The scope of the present treatment is limited to a discussion of the legal
principles of guilt-finding alone.
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encies. On the other hand, between seven and fourteen, the approximate
limits of the basic public school education, the question for the application
of the defense is whether the infant has actually learned of societal demands
concerning his conduct. The presumption is that he has not. The rule is
stated that an infant between seven and fourteen is presumed not to know
right from wrong and may be convicted only if the prosecution can show
that actually he does know right from wrong. Infants in the transition
stage are said to indicate anti-social tendencies only when they react antisocially after learning of societal demands. If they have not yet learned,
it is believed that their conduct results from the lack of learning which itgelf
will occur so soon that they can safely be trusted at large. If they have
learned as much as society can teach them and still react anti-socially, they
possess the same tendencies as would be indicated by an adult. Children
who have not yet learned will grow out of their immediate tendencies
which are, hence, not permanent. Children who have learned, and all
adults, will not grow out of such tendencies which are, therefore, permanent enough to demand punishment on a recidivistic basis. On the other
hand, the infancy defense does not extend to low mental age of a chronological adult, short of the insanity defense. This is correct. Low mental
age merely indicates a permanent inability ever to learn societal demands
and hence indicates more, rather than less anti-social tendency. It is but a
matter of the insanity defense next to be considered, but not of the infancy
defense as such.
The insanity defense, perhaps with far less functional justification,
also acquits one who, because of mental defect, is unaware of the societal
consequences of his conduct. Thus the MacNaghten case 73 stated, as one
of the types of situation which would acquit one for mental defect, the
inability to know right from wrong concerning the act. In the alternative,
the same case recognized unawareness of immediate conduct as defensive
by its other rule that if from mental defect one was unable to be aware of
what he was then doing he should be acquitted. Save for the further rejection of irresistible impulse as a defense, which is the rule in the majority
of jurisdictions, it is hard to rationalize the insanity defenses in terms of
the recidivism theory although they are usually classified as involving a
negation of mens rea. The further ramification in the insane delusion test
seems to be a substantial expression of the right and wrong test itself in
terms nominally similar to the mistake of fact defense, i. e., to the effect
that the delusion, like the mistake, must be as to a factor which would be
defensive itself if true. It would seem that the right and wrong test is
functionally invalid, due to the fact that it is safe to assume that mental
disorder indicates more of a likelihood of recurrence of anti-social conduct
73. io Clark & Fin. 2oo (1843).
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rather than less. Rather we must rationalize the right and wrong test in
terms other than of recidivism. The acquittal of the insane criminal results
from a public feeling of sympathy for him. We sympathize with the one
who, from mental defect, cannot know right from wrong, and this feeling
of sympathy suppresses the normal demand for vengeance and swings the
pendulum to the other side, with the result of acquittal. Or it may be a
human idea that it is improper to punish one who is unable personally to
be deterred by punishment. Further it may be explained by a human feeling
that the punishment of one unable to choose right from wrong may disgust,
rather than frighten and deter, his fellow men.
There is not space at present for a detailed functional critique of the
insanity defenses nor of the proposals for the reform thereof. Suffice it to
say that the present legal tests for acquittal for mental defect do not accord
with recidivistic ideas, but rather with ideas of vengeance and deterrence.
Ignorance of the law, while a satisfactory enough test for, infants, because
for them it does indicate a lack of anti-social tendency, is not a satisfactory
test for mentally deficient adults who, because of their mental defect, cannot
ever learn sufficiently to avoid being offenders in the future. The insanity
defense is one spot where a proposition of criminal intent cannot be rationalized in terms of the recidivism approach to the policy of punishment.
Rather, considerations of vengeance and deterrence have influenced this
alleged matter of criminal intent. Where elsewhere rules of criminal intent
take their differences in terms of relative anti-social tendency, here the line
is drawn in another manner.
CONCLUSION

For any specific crime, under the law of guilt, there must concur three
abstract elements, first, a stated socially damaging occurrence, or criminal
result, or corpus delicti; second, legally causative conduct engaged in by the
accused offender, of a sort which is socially dangerous when committed by
any person; and, third, an indication that the offender possesses the requisite
anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism, i. e., a criminal intent or
mens rea. All of these must concur to have guilt. The lack of any one of
them will prevent a conviction even though there be sufficient proof of the
other two. Problems of the substantive criminal law thus resolve themselves into problems of the elements of guilt as they appear in specific crimes.
The rationalization of past decisions and the prediction as to future ones
should be made in terms of the legal interpretation of these three respective
elements of the given type of crime.
These three elements of criminality are correlated to the three separable
types of theory concerning the purpose of criminal punishment and represent, respectively, the influence of these varying theories on the legal rules.
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The vengeance theory expresses a human attitude that criminal punishment
should be a quid pro quo, compensating for that which has already occurred,
and thus emphasizing the criminal result or corpus delicti. The deterrence
theory consists of a human attitude that criminal punishment should be
administered for the purpose of discouraging future causative conduct by
punishing present conduct which has been causative or is very likely to be so.
The recidivism theory presents a belief that punishment should be assessed
as a way of preventing future criminality by the present offender. Thus it
should be imposed only if by his conduct he manifests a likelihood of such
future criminality. The law follows all three theories with varying emphasis by its requirement of the concurrence of three elements of criminality
the functions of which are to require, respectively, a stated criminal result
for which vengeance is demanded, the socially dangerous causative conduct
which is in need of deterrence, and some manifestation of the offender's
socially dangerous personality which indicates that he is possessed of an antisocial tendency or likelihood of recidivism. All of these human demands
concerning the purpose of punishment must be satisfied before a human
being can be punished for a given crime.
This classification of the elements of criminality furnishes an apt outline
of the whole body of the substantive criminal law. General principles of
criminality underlying all specific crimes can thus be classified according to
the particular element of criminality involved in their application and according to the correlative theory of criminology which seems to underly them.
Specific crimes can be dissected and their particular elements discussed in
their proper place in the outline of result, conduct, and intent.
Thus, under the heading of "vengeance and the corpus delicti" we have
seen that the attempt device and consent defense involve particularly
the question of the presence of the requisite corpus delicti. Unless there is
a sufficient criminal result of the kind involved in the crime attempted, there
is no criminal attempt even though there be intent and socially dangerous
conduct. Likewise consent may be defensive only when it does actually
negative the presence of a corpus delicti of the instant crime.
Under the heading of "deterrence and causation" we have seen that
there are properly classified the general principles of solicitation, conspiracy,
vicarious guilt of accomplices and employers, and crimes of omission. The
immediate question in all these is whether there has happened causative
conduct, i. e., conduct which ought to be prevented from happening in the
future. The objective is to single out such conduct so that the spectacle of
the present punishment of it may frighten potential offenders from doing the
same thing. The test for the application of punishment to such conduct is
whether it is so potentially dangerous as to make it desirable of being discouraged in such a manner.
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When we turn to the third topic, i. e., "recidivism and mens rea," we
find that the only positive general principle therein is the conceptual requirement of some proof of anti-social tendency in all crimes. But this differs
from crime to crime, both in the nominal wording of the intent element, and
in the extent and sort of anti-social tendency demanded to be proved. On
the other hand, the criminal defenses involving the absence of intent are
matters of the general principles underlying all crimes. These criminal defenses-and they represent all of the criminal defenses save consent-are
matters of the negation of criminal intent, or of the absence of the requisite
anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism. Many of these defenses give
recognition to the principle that if one's conduct is definitely a reaction to a
given stimulating factor, the conduct will recur only so often as the factor
does, so that if the latter is but sporadic, so is the former. Other of these
defenses recognize that one's lack of awareness of his conduct or of its
physical or societal consequences may show that his physical conduct does
not indicate sufficient anti-social tendency. The objective of all these defenses
is to carry forward the recidivism policy of punishing only those who, in
addition to the causation of a criminal result, actually manifest a dangerous
personality, i. e., a likelihood of recidivism.
When we look at the details of the specific crimes themselves, we find
that it is opportune to dissect them and classify their components under the
three headings of result, conduct, and intent. It so happens that, save for
homicide and its question of proximate cause, the debatable details of the
specific crimes fall only under the two headings of the corpus delicti and the
criminal intent.
It leads to clearer thinking about the details of specific crimes to dissect
them into their components and to think of the resultant elements as separate
entities. Usually, in a given case, the debatable problem involves either the
corpus delicti, or the intent, but not both. But should there be debatable
problems of both, it is even more important to dissect the two propositions
so that thinking about one shall not be confused by irrelevant considerations
about the other.
Paradoxical though it may seem, the "general principles" approach to
criminal law is really more specific than the "specific crimes" approach. The
proper application of the general principles analysis requires more than
merely treating of each specific crime by itself as would the specific crimes
approach. The general principles approach calls for a finer dissection of each
specific type of crime into its components.
When we speak of "general principles" we mean one of two things.
One refers to those propositions of the substantive criminal law which apply
equally to two or more different specific crimes. In that sense the attempt
device, the consent defense, the principles of solicitation, conspiracy, vica-
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rious guilt, crimes of omission, and the whole calendar of mens rea defenses
are "general principles." In the other sense general principles are those
fundamental considerations of criminology which underlie the component
elements of the specific details of the separate specific crimes. Thus underlying the corpus delicti element in all specific crimes is the general principle
that there cannot be conviction for any crime save where there has occurred
the stated socially damaging occurrence for which public vengeance is demanded. The rationalization of specific decisions about the corpus delicti
element of that or other crimes may aid in developing a technique for the
prediction of the future solution of unsolved problems of the corpus delicti.
Save for the proximate cause problem in homicide, the causation element of
the various specific crimes presents no difficult problem. The required element of causation is present in all crimes, but there can rarely be a debatable
problem about its application.
It is on the third element, that of mens rea, that the use of the general
principles approach in understanding specific crimes comes best into play.
The writer feels that it is impossible to understand the differing and confusing words inserted into criminal definitions on the intent issue without going
back to the underlying principles of the whole topic of criminal intent. The
general principles of recidivism are worked out in terms of punishing the
one who does possess an anti-social tendency or likelihood of recidivism, of
freeing the one who does not, and of scaling the punishment in terms of the
relative degree of tendency. Thus understood, these principles aid in interpreting the nominal elements written into criminal definitions for the purpose
of requiring some proof of intent, and in deciding whether for the given
crime there must be proven any specific element of extrinsically proven intent.
It seems to the writer that the "specific crimes" approach of considering
each separate crime by itself without respect to its inter-relation to the whole
system of criminal law is a mistake. For while it is true, for instance, that
a case deciding a point of attempted rape is hardly a precedent on another
point of attempted larceny, yet an analysis of why the former case was
decided on the basis of the particular element in question may help in developing a technique for predicting the decision on the latter point-so long as
the element of guilt happens to be the same. Thus when criminal attempts
are rationalized in terms of the extent to which there has happened a requisite corpus delicti, the relation between cases of attempted rape and attempted
larceny seems more apparent.
The "general principles" approach, properly applied, i. e., the dissection
of each crime into its component elements and a consideration of each of the
particular elements in terms of the criminological theory underlying it, seems
to lead to the better understanding of difficult problems of rationalizing
decided cases and predicting the solution of novel situations. A proper con-
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sideration of the elements of criminality in terms of their functional nature
seems to aid in this process.
To avenge a past offense, to prevent future similar offenses by any
person, and to prevent future criminality of any kind by the present offender,
the law takes the step of punishment. The various detailed rules of criminal
law have as their function the enforcing of these various attitudes toward
societal treatment for crime. It is desirable that courts in interpreting the
legal details should apply them in terms of the policy immediately sought to
be served rather than in terms of legalistic logic or word-definition. The
principal argument for the "general principles" approach is that it facilitates
the integration of these functional considerations with the legal rules of guilt.

